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This paper shows that the degree of competition aﬀects the current
account response to nominal shocks. The mechanism hinges on the re-
lationship between the mark-up and the degree of real rigidity of prices.
In a model with intermediate goods, the degree of real rigidity increases
in the markup. A weaker response of prices to nominal shocks strength-
ens the “expenditure switching” eﬀect of the devaluation to the beneﬁt
of the current account. We ﬁrst analyse the relationship between the
mark-up and the real rigidity in a simple closed economy model. We
then show numerically how the mark-up can aﬀect the response of the
current account to monetary shocks.
Keywords: Current account; mark-up; monopolistic competition;
persistence; real rigidity; nominal rigidity.
JEL: F32, E32Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass der Grad der Wettbewerbsintensität
die Reaktion der Leistungsbilanz auf nominale Schocks beeinflusst.
Entscheidend hierfür ist der Zusammenhang zwischen dem Mark-up
und der realen Rigidität der Preise. In einem Modell mit
Zwischenprodukten nimmt die reale Rigidität mit dem Mark-up zu. Bei
einer schwächeren Reaktion der Preise auf nominale Schocks führt eine
Abwertung zu einer stärkeren Verschiebung der Ausgaben mit positiven
Auswirkungen auf die Leistungsbilanz. Zunächst wird das Verhältnis
zwischen dem Mark-up und der realen Rigidität in einem einfachen
Modell einer geschlossenen Volkswirtschaft untersucht. Anschließend
wird numerisch dargestellt, wie der Mark-up die Reaktion der
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1 Introduction
Many studies have addressed the macroeconomic consequences of ﬁrm-level
price rigidities. This New Keynesian literature has highlighted the importance
of the market structure - degree and type of imperfect competition - for an
economy’s response to nominal shocks. Two signiﬁcant ﬁndings are that im-
perfect competition alone is insuﬃcient to undermine the neutrality of money
and that endogenous price stickiness, or “real rigidity” of prices, is typically
required for the real eﬀects of nominal disturbances to be reasonably persis-
tent: a point that has been particularly emphasized by Ball and Romer (1990)
and Kimball (1995). They show that the sensitivity of a ﬁrm’s optimal relative
price to aggregate shocks, i.e. the degree of real rigidity, is a crucial factor in
the transmission of monetary perturbations. The role played by this sensi-
tivity diﬀers according to the type of nominal rigidities assumed. In a model
of “menu costs” (` al aMankiw, 1985) or of limited rationality (` al aAkerlof
and Yellen, 1985) reduced sensitivity implies a reduced incentive to adjust
1Forthcoming in the Canadian Journal of Economics. An earlier version of this paper
was written while the author was a lecturer in the Department of Economics, Trinity College
Dublin, Ireland. The author is indebted to the people at Trinity College for their kind help.
The author also wishes to thank the following people for their help and useful comments:
Philip Lane, Stephanie Schmitt-Groh´ e, Michael Devereux, the participants at a seminar in
the Department of Economics, University of Trento and those at a seminar in the Department
of Economics, NUI-Maynooth, Ireland. Some of the material in this paper appeared in
an earlier working paper presented at the Annual Conference of the European Economic
Association, 2000, and at the Macro, Money and Finance Conference, 2000. The views
expressed in the paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Bundesbank.
1prices in response to aggregate nominal demand shocks. In models with a par-
tial adjustment of prices (` al aCalvo, 1983) or with a staggered price setting
(` al aTaylor 1980), reduced sensitivity implies only a limited response of the
aggregate price level.
The main objective of later macroeconomic research on this topic was to ad-
dress “persistence”.2 In this respect, the distinction between “nominal rigidi-
ties” (e.g. price contract length) and “real rigidity” (optimal price responsive-
ness to aggregate shocks) has proved particularly useful.3 Indeed, one of the
major contributions of microfounded models of price stickiness, as opposed to
old Keynesian models, can be seen in the ability of these models to highlight
various factors that could increase the stickiness of prices beyond the length
of the “price contracts”. A number of these factors have been discussed in
recent papers, e.g. countercyclical mark-ups (Ball and Romer (1990), Kiley
(1997) and Bergin and Feenstra (2000)), intermediate goods (Basu (1995),
Bergin and Feenstra (2000) and Barro and Tenreyro (2000)), and the degree
of competition in equilibrium (Kimball (1995) and Romer (1996, ch 6)).
This study describes the contribution of steady-state competition to “per-
sistence” and hence to the current account response to nominal shocks. We
show how the degree of competition can aﬀect the current account response to
monetary shocks through the demand for production factors in a model with
composite demand ` al aGal´ i (1994, 1996) and intermediate goods in production
` al aBasu (1995).
Since the seminal work of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995, 1996) there has been
a proliferation of open economy models with nominal rigidities.4 Some of these
models address the implications of nominal rigidities for the current account
2See, for example, Chari et al. (2000), Erceg (1997) and Bergin and Feenstra (1999).
3A clear discussion is given in Romer (1996, ch 6).
4For a recent survey of the New Open Economy literature see Lane (2000).
2dynamics. For example, Lane (2001) considers the current account response in
a two-country, two-sector model with price rigidities. In his model, the current
account response depends on both the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
in consumption and the degree of substitutability between imported and do-
mestically produced goods. Lane also provides some empirical support for
the positive relationship between the current account and monetary shocks.5
Lombardo (1998) also shows that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
can aﬀect the trade balance dynamics in this class of models, besides the more
traditional Marshall-Lerner condition.6 Devereux (2001) looks at the eﬀects of
a devaluation on the current account. He ﬁnds that the Marshall-Lerner con-
dition governs the current account response to a monetary shock when prices
are set in the currency of the producer. When prices are set in the currency of
the buyer (pricing to market), the intertemporal elasticity of substitution also
plays an important role. By and large, therefore, there is some consensus about
the importance of the wealth eﬀect (measured by the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution) for the adjustment of the foreign trade balance. Nevertheless,
none of these works has considered the role of the degree of competition in the
current account response to shocks. This paper sets out to ﬁll that gap.7
Our main result can be summarised as follows. Assuming that there is some
degree of substitutability between intermediate goods and other production
factors, the steady-state level of the mark-up will be inversely related to the
share of intermediate goods used in production. This result has also been
5Recently Giuliodori (2001) has extended Lane’s work to 15 OECD countries, with similar
results.
6This condition states that the current account improves upon a devaluation if the sum
of the elasticity of import and export is larger than one (Krugman and Obsfeld, 1997).
7Andersen and Beier (1999) also point out that current research has failed to highlight
the importance of the relationship between “persistence” and the current account.
3pointed out in a recent paper by Barro and Tenreyro (2000) in a model that
produces a countercyclical mark-up. Since the production of intermediate
goods competes with the production of ﬁnal goods for the allocation of scarce
resources, a lower share of intermediates implies lower production costs and
hence more real rigidity. In a 2-country model with ﬂexible exchange rates,
when a monetary shock hits one of the countries, the “expenditure switching”
that follows is larger the smaller the price increase in the devaluing country.
Therefore, the current account is more likely to improve in the event of a
positive monetary shock (devaluation) if there is less competition.
The rest of this study is organised as follows. Section 2 builds a simple
closed economy model with composite demand, an “input-output” production
structure and monopolistic competition.8 This section shows analytically the
mechanism through which the mark-up can aﬀect the price-level response to
monetary shocks. Section 3expands the model into a two-country version as
a means of linking the degree of competition to the current account response.
This version of the model also introduces capital accumulation. The linearised
solution and the simulations are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
8By “input-output” production we refer to the production structure described in Basu
(1995). Basu contrasts this structure with “in-line” production. The former is such that all
goods produced enter the production process of all the goods produced in the economy. The
latter is such that ﬁnal goods do not enter the production process of intermediate goods.
The Basu set-up is widely used in this type of model (see, for example, Bergin and Feenstra
(2000) and Barro and Tenreyro (2000)).
42 Composite demand and price response in a
closed economy
As stated in the introduction, the relationship between the degree of compe-
tition and the current account response to monetary shocks passes through
the “real rigidity” eﬀect on the aggregate price adjustment. In this section we
isolate this price eﬀect by solving a closed economy model based on the same
structure of the open economy version presented below.
To this end we use a reduced-form model. The behavioural equations
are typical of models of monopolistic competition with intermediate goods
in production and Taylor nominal price contracts. The underlying agents’
problem from which they stem is very similar to that which is presented in the
open economy sections below.
2.1 Households
Households have preferences over consumption of a wide range of diﬀerentiated
goods and over the amount of time dedicated to labour. There is a contin-
uum of households, which we index on the unitary segment. The demand for






where pj is the price of item j, P is the aggregate price level, θ>1i st h e
absolute value of the elasticity of substitution between goods, and C denotes
real expenditure.





5where v is a positive constant and M is the money stock.







where L is the total amount of labour supplied, ζ>0 is the elasticity of labour
supply and W is the nominal wage rate.
2.2 Firms
There are many monopolistically competitive ﬁrms producing a range of par-
tially substitutable goods. Firms are indexed on the continuous segment of
measure 1. The products are demanded by households as consumer goods and
by all ﬁrms as intermediate goods. Following Gal´ i (1994, 1996), we assume
that goods are sold at the same price whatever their ﬁnal destination. The
demand for intermediate goods (denoted by z) is similar to the demand for
ﬁnal goods except for the elasticity, which in principle can diﬀer from θ.I nt h i s
section we assume identical elasticities, while diﬀerent elasticities are consid-
ered in the next section.10 Hence the demand for intermediate goods is similar
to that for consumer goods (equation (1)).
The total composite demand faced by ﬁrm j is therefore





where Z is the total real demand for intermediate goods.
The elasticity of this demand with respect to the relative price is simply θ,
so that the equilibrium mark-up of prices over marginal cost is µ = θ(θ − 1)
−1.
9Contrary to the open economy model we assume in this section that labour supply is
not a function of income.
10Identical elasticities are assumed in Basu (1995), Bergin and Feenstra (2000) and Barro
and Tenreyro (2000).





We assume here that ﬁrms can be divided in two cohorts of equal size,
according to the timing of price-setting. They set prices for two consecutive
periods in a staggered fashion, ` al aTaylor (1980). When ﬁrms set prices, they
do so in order to maximise proﬁts for two consecutive periods. All ﬁrms within
the same group set identical prices. In any one period the aggregate price level
is simply the average of the prices of the two groups, i.e. Pt = 1
2 (pt + pt−1).
2.3 Solution
To solve the model we linearise it around the symmetric steady state.
We ﬁrst note that proﬁt maximisation implies the following conditional















This tells us that the equilibrium share of intermediate goods in output is
inversely related to the mark-up. This is indeed a standard result: the larger
the mark-up the smaller the share of factors of production in total output. In
the speciﬁc case of intermediate goods this is tantamount to saying that the
demand for intermediate goods decreases in the mark-up.
The linearised composite demand faced by each ﬁrm is
˜ Dj,t = −θ












˜ Ct; j = {1,2}. (5)
The aggregate demand is therefore ˜ Dt = αµ−1 ˜ Zt +( 1− αµ−1) ˜ Ct .
7Given our production function, the marginal cost is
 MC = ˜ P +( 1− α)

˜ W − ˜ P

, (6)
so that the optimal demand for intermediate goods can be expressed as
˜ Zt =( 1− α)

˜ Wt − ˜ Pt

+ ˜ Dt . (7)
We can obtain a real wage equation by solving for the labour market equilib-
rium.
The labour supply is simply ˜ Ls,t = ζ

˜ Wt − ˜ Pt

, whereas the conditional
demand for labour is ˜ Ld,t = −α

˜ Wt − ˜ Pt

+ ˜ Dt. Equating demand and supply
and solving for the real wage, we obtain
˜ Wt − ˜ Pt =( ζ + α)
−1 ˜ Dt . (8)
Using equation (8) in equation (7) and the deﬁnition of aggregate demand, we
can express the demand for intermediate goods as a function of the demand
for ﬁnal goods, i.e.
˜ Zt = ψ ˜ Ct , (9)





Using equations (2), (8), and (9) in the marginal cost equation (6) we
obtain
 MCt =Φ Mt +( 1− Φ) ˜ Pt , (10)
where Φ = (1 − α)

ζ + α(µ − 1)(µ − α)
−1−1
> 0.
It is immediately evident that Φ is decreasing in µ. A large mark-up implies
a reduced sensitivity of the marginal cost to a monetary shock, when prices
do not adjust completely. This can also be seen in the relation between the
demand for intermediate goods and the demand for ﬁnal goods (equation (9)).
8Since ψ is decreasing in µ, a higher degree of imperfect competition induces
a smaller use of intermediate goods for any unit of output and hence reduces
the pressure on production costs. In the following it will be useful to note that
ψ − 1=Φ µ(µ − α)
−1.
Moreover, as α tends to zero, the marginal cost becomes independent of
the degree of competition, boiling down to ζ−1: the higher the elasticity of
substitution of labour the higher the real rigidity.
To demonstrate the relationship between the degree of competition (the
mark-up) and persistence, let us ﬁrst assume that ﬁrms determine prices as
an arithmetic average of the optimal price in two consecutive periods. That is
	 pt =0 .5

 MCt + E( MCt+1)

,w h e r eE denotes the expectation operator. By
substituting equation (10) in this expression we obtain
	 pt =0 .5






Φ  Mt+1 +( 1− Φ) ˜ Pt+1

. (11)
For the sake of simplicity we also assume that the money stock is a random
walk, i.e. Mt = Mt−1 +ut,w h e r eut is white noise. Using the deﬁnition of the
aggregate price, the solution of equation (11) is then 11











so that |λ| < 1.
From equation (12) we can see that the impact of a monetary shock on the
price level increases in λ. This will have important consequences in the open
economy model: the current account response to nominal shocks will depend
on the size of this parameter. Furthermore, if we are willing to assume that
prices do not oscillate around their long-run level, i.e. 0 <λ<1, then the
11Solving equation (11) is straightforward. See, for example, Romer (1996, ch 6, section
6.5).
9larger λ is, the longer it will take for the price to converge to its long run-
level.12 Note that Φ is decreasing in µ while λ is decreasing in Φ. A larger
mark-up implies a weaker impact of the monetary shock on the price level as
well as a more persistent deviation of the price level from its long-run level.
In the open economy model discussed in the following sections, the response
of the current account depends on the amount of “expenditure switching”
and hence on the response of the price level to the nominal shock. We can
therefore say that the response of the current account is linked to the amount
of persistence in the economy.13 This claim is substantiated in the following
section.
3 A two-country model
The model we use in this and the following sections is a New Open Economy
model. It is a two-country model with imperfect competition and Calvo (1983)
price-contracts.
We now use Calvo contracts for computational convenience. Calvo con-
tracts give much smoother price responses and generate a more parsimonious
model than the Taylor assumption.
In this section we assume that the production technology requires the use
of all the goods produced internationally, although there is a certain degree of
substitutability among them. We also introduce capital accumulation. This
12Note that in the long-run, the change in the price level will be identical to the change
in the money stock: money is neutral in the long-run.
13In theory, Φ could be larger than one. In this case the price level would respond more
than proportionally to the monetary shock and it would then oscillate towards its long run
value. Since this is not considered to be a good description of reality, it is typically assumed
that Φ lies between zero and one.
10provides an extra dynamic source to the model as well as an important source
of production costs. We are thus able to assess whether the eﬀect of the degree
of competition on the current account is still detectable in a more complete
setting with capital accumulation.
3.1 Households
We assume that there are only two countries in the world, which we name
“home” and “foreign”. The world population has measure 1. A fraction n of
the world population lives in the home country, while the fraction (1 − n) lives
in the foreign country. All individuals within a country are identical.
Households have preferences over consumer goods, real balances and labour
supply. Households consume all types of goods produced in the two countries.
We assume that the variety of goods produced in the home country is of
measure n and that the variety produced in the foreign country is of measure
(1 − n). These various consumer goods are aggregated by the following CES













































where ch and cf represent home and foreign consumer goods, respectively.
θ>0 is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced domestically
and imported goods. ω>0 is the elasticity of substitution between goods
produced within the same country (both in absolute values). Both elasticities
are assumed to be identical across countries. The foreign country has, mutatis





































where E stands for the price of the foreign currency in terms of the home
currency (the nominal exchange rate), pj is the price of item ch,j and qj is the
price of item cf,j expressed in foreign currency.
Markets are not segmented internationally with the result that the law of
one price holds. Since all goods are traded purchasing power parity also holds.












where the superscript W stands for world aggregate.




























12s.t. Ms + Bs+1 + Fs+1 + PI,sXs = wsls + Pk,sKs + Ms−1 +Π s+ (19)
+( 1+is)Bs +( 1+τs)Fs − PsCs − Ts







Ks+1 = Is +( 1− d)Ks (21)
s = t...∞ ,
where K is the capital stock, ls is the labour supply, C is the consumption index
deﬁned by equation (13), M is money, B is a nominal bond, in home currency,
which represents the debt/credit stance of home households with respect to
foreign households, F is a domestic bond with zero aggregate net supply, P is
the consumer price index as deﬁned by equation (14), w is the nominal wage,
Π is the sum of proﬁt shares from all ﬁrms, T is tax (transfer) paid by (to) the
individual, i is the (consumption based) nominal return on foreign assets and
τ is the nominal return on domestic assets. It is assumed that φ and σ are
positive; so is the elasticity of labour supply ζ. Finally β =( 1+δ)−1,w h e r e
δ (bounded between zero and one) is the rate of time preference. X is total
investment, i.e. gross investment plus the installation cost. κ is a positive
constant.14
Gross investment I is a CES aggregate of all types of goods produced
in the world, similar to equation (13). As for the investment aggregator we
denote by  ω the elasticity of substitution between goods produced within the
same country and by η the elasticity of substitution between imported and
domestically produced goods. The price indexes for this aggregator are similar
to those for the consumer goods aggregator (equations (14)-(16)).
Labour is internationally immobile. Households lend capital only to do-
14An alternative would be to make ﬁrms own the capital stock directly. This would clearly
not alter our results. Our structure can be found, for example, in Chari et al. (2000)
13mestic ﬁrms.
The foreign relations are simply a duplicate of all the equations applicable
to the home households, except that to convert home into foreign prices we
must apply the reverse exchange rate E−1. The foreign variables are indicated
by an asterisk. Notice, in particular, that the foreign price indexes are denoted
by P ∗ and P ∗
Z rather than by Q etc.
Our assumption regarding the household problem is widely used in New
Open Economy macro models (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1996). One of the
features of this set-up is that it implies incomplete asset markets. A well-
known consequence is that these models display non-stationary dynamics, so
that linearising the model around the initial steady state could yield a poor
approximation of the non-linear model. A great many papers have dealt with
these issues in the recent literature.15
Generally, this problem does not aﬀect the predictions produced by the
models. As we will show, this also applies to our model. There are at least
two ways in which the unit root in the dynamics of our economy can be elim-
inated.16 One consists of introducing an endogenous discount factor (e.g. De-
vereux and Shi (1991) and Schmitt-Groh´ e (1998)). The other amounts to
imposing a “premium” on the asset return which is proportional to the out-
standing stock of bonds. In other words there is an upward sloping supply
curve for funds. Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2000) (SGU hereafter) use the
latter technique in a small open economy model.
In our model we use a modiﬁed version of the latter solution. In a small
open economy model the SGU solution is equivalent to introducing an asym-
15These include Devereux and Shi (1991), Schmitt-Groh´ e (1998), Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe
(2000) and Letendre (2000).
16These were kindly suggested to the author by Stephanie Schmitt-Groh´ e and Mick Dev-
ereux.
14metry into the return on foreign assets faced by the domestic economy as
opposed to the international return. In a two-country model this implies that
the interest rate on bonds paid by the debtor diﬀers from the interest rate
received by the creditor. Various explanations can be given for the existence
of this kind of asymmetry.17 Nevertheless, since this type of asymmetry has
no microfoundation in this model, it is best explained by the fact that it elim-
inates the nonstationarity. This is the argument prevailing in the literature
and the one we prefer. We also follow the literature in calibrating such an
asymmetry so to minimise its eﬀects on the dynamics of our model.
This ﬁnancial friction enables us to check whether the sensitivity of the
current account with respect to the degree of competition is dependent on the
non-stationarity of the current account. The simulation results given below
demonstrate clearly that the current account response to a monetary shock is
sensitive to the degree of competition, irrespective of whether there is or not a
unit root in the foreign asset position. The intuition behind this result is that
the long-run asset position can, at most, aﬀect current expenditure levels (via
intertemporal substitution and consumption smoothing), but does not aﬀect
the current expenditure switching. It is the latter and not the former that
determines the sign of the current account response in our symmetric model.
This presumption is conﬁrmed by sensitivity analysis (not shown), where the
degree of intertemporal substitution as well as the steady-state asset return
are increased one hundred fold. Given these parameter values, there was no
change in the qualitative response of the current account.
Let us deﬁne the home return on domestic assets as
it = i
W
t P (Bt) , (22)
17For example a fee (or tax etc) that varies across countries and that is proportional to
their foreign asset position.
15where iW is the nominal return on bonds ex-premium and where P (Bt)i st h e
premium. We assume that the premium is positive and that P (0) = 1.





t) is the positive foreign premium, such that P∗ (0) = 1.
The ﬁrst order conditions of the household problem are the usual in this
class of models, except for the optimal interest rate. Having introduced an
asymmetric premium, the equilibrium interest rate is
(1 + τt+1)=( 1+it+1)+P





  (Bt+1)Bt+1) . (24)
Similar conditions hold for the foreign household. In particular, it is worth






























t is the (foreign) bond holding of the foreign household in home cur-
rency units.
For the sake of simplicity we assume that the two countries are of equal
size, so that Bt = −B∗
t. Then, isolating iW
t+1 from equation (24) and replacing



















P (Bt+1)+P  (Bt+1)Bt+1

. (26)
Equation (26) is a modiﬁed Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) condition. The
term in square brackets on the right-hand side of equation (26) measures the
distortion caused by the premium. This distortion disappears when there are
zero foreign bond holdings. There would also be no distortion if the premium
were symmetric across countries.
16For our model to yield a stable solution we must impose the following
condition on the premium faced by the two countries
P
∗  (0) + P
  (0) < 0 . (27)
Condition (27) basically states that the change in the return faced by the
debtor country (adjusted for the exchange rate variation) is larger than the
change in the return faced by the creditor country. To see how condition (27)





t+1 = 	 Et − 	 Et+1 +
δ
δ +1
	 τt+1 − 2P0C0 [P
∗  (0) + P
  (0)] 	 Bt+1 . (28)
So, for example, leaving aside the exchange rate, if the home country becomes
a net creditor

	 Bt+1 > 0

, its interest rate will go up by less than the increase
in the foreign interest rate.
In order to reduce the distortion of the ad hoc premium imposed in the
model, and following Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2000), we calibrate the coef-
ﬁcient on bonds in equation (28), so that, virtually, the UIP still holds.
3.2 Money supply.
Money supply innovations are transferred in full to households by the govern-
ment. That is
Mt+1 − Mt = Tt . (29)
A similar equation applies to the foreign country.
3.3 Firms
Each ﬁrm in the world produces only one type of goods. This implies that there
are n ﬁrms in the home country and (1 − n) in the foreign country. They sell
their products in monopolistically competitive markets.
17We assume that ﬁrms set their prices in an asynchronous fashion according
to Calvo contracts. Firms sell the same item to consumers (for consumption
or investment), and to ﬁrms as intermediate goods. Firms can not segment
these three markets, with the result that they sell the same item at the same
price in all markets.





αZ − Q, (30)
where αL,α K,α Z > 0a n dαL+αK +αZ =1 ,Q is a ﬁxed production cost.18 Z
is a CES aggregate of intermediate goods similar to equations (13), but with
the same elasticities assumed for the investment goods.19 The price indexes for
this aggregate are therefore the same as those holding for investment goods.
That is PZ = PI.
3.3.1 Composite demand and variable elasticity
In this model we assume that each ﬁrm faces a demand composed of three
sub-demands: the demand for consumer goods, the demand for investment






















18A ﬁxed cost is typically introduced in models of monopolistic competition to eliminate
“pure proﬁts”. By controlling the size of Q we can control the degree of increasing returns
in our model. We show that this source of increasing returns produces quantitative eﬀects
but has no qualitative implications.
19In the simulations we also considered an alternative grouping of goods, i.e. consump-
tion goods and investment goods with the same elasticity. The main conclusion remains
unaﬀected.































Therefore ε is an average of the intra-country elasticity of substitution for
consumer goods and for the demand for “non-human factors of production”
(NHF, hereafter). Clearly if ω =ˆ ω then ε = ω so that ε is constant.
The variability of the mark-up is a “natural” feature of the composite de-
mand structure. A countercyclical markup is widely acknowledged to be an
important source of real rigidity and hence it may well contribute to explaining
the persistence of the real eﬀects of monetary shock (see Rotemberg and Wood-
ford, 1999). In terms of what we claimed in the opening sections, it should also
contribute to the determination of the current account, as is shown below.20
3.4 Calvo contracts
We assume here that there is an exogenously given probability, say γ,t h a ta










where Rs,t =( 1+rt)
−1 (1 + rt+1)
−1···(1 + rt+s)
−1 and where (1 + rt+1)Pt+1 =
(1 + τt+1)Pt. That is to say, when the ﬁrm chooses its price, it has to take
20In this model, as in Gal´ i (1996) and Lombardo (1999), there are multiple steady states
if the symmetric equilibrium equation for the elasticity admits more than one solutions.
The symmetric equilibrium equation for the elasticity is ε = ω (1 − ϕ(µ)) + ˆ ωϕ(µ), where
µ = ε(ε − 1)−1 is the steady state markup and ϕ(µ)=( X + Z)(Y )−1 is the share of NHF
in total production. We don’t pursue this possibility here and refer the interested reader to
the above mentioned relevant papers.
19account of the probability that it will exist in the following period, in the










Ps Ds (1 − εs)
. (33)
The aggregate price of home produced goods is





That is, in each period γ ﬁrms leave their price unchanged, while (1 − γ) ﬁrms
set a new price. This price still holds in period t for these ﬁrms with probability
γn. The aggregate price is the weighted average of all prices which were set in
the past and still prevail.














h,Z +( 1− n)(EP f,Z)
1−η 1
1−η ,
where Ph is the home price index of domestically produced goods and Pf is
the foreign counterpart deﬁned in equations (15) and (16).
20With the Calvo pricing assumption the current account can be written as

































intermediate goods net export
.
That is to say, home consumption and asset accumulation has to be ﬁnanced
by the total home value added plus the ﬁnancial wealth, once the net imports
of intermediate goods have been paid for.
Note that in equation (35) the elasticity of substitution between imported
goods and domestically produced goods appears explicitly, unlike the elastic-
ity on which the mark-up is based. We now go on to show that both types of
elasticities aﬀect the response of the current account through diﬀerent mech-
anisms.
4 Linearisation and solution
The model is linearised around the symmetric equilibrium with zero bond
holdings. The model is then simulated numerically under the assumption of a
1% unforeseen increase of the home money supply.
4.1 Equilibrium
An equilibrium for this economy is given by the set of values for each of the
linearised variables, in such a way that the ﬁrst order conditions for the house-
hold problem and for the ﬁrm problem are satisﬁed, markets clear and the
economy remains bounded as t →∞ .
21The model is solved by numerical simulation and the results are shown in
the following section.
4.2 The current account response
The response of the current account to monetary shocks depends on three
broad factors: the elasticity of demand with respect to the terms of trade
(the “Marshall-Lerner eﬀect”); the response of the terms of trade to the shock
(the “price eﬀect”); and the response of the total components of demand (the
“volume” eﬀect or the “absorption” eﬀect). Trade in intermediate goods adds
both to the price eﬀect (positively, through an increased real rigidity) and to
the volume eﬀect (negatively, through an extra source of absorption).
Investment in capital also aﬀects the current account in this way. Never-
theless, its contribution is negative for both the price eﬀect and the volume
eﬀect. The stronger the response of investment, the stronger the pressure on
scarce resources and hence on costs, without the advantage of transmitting the
price inertia vertically.
In all our simulations we impose values on the parameters that can be
derived from the related literature,21 setting σ =2 ,ζ =1 ,φ =9 ,δ =0 .04 and
d =0 .06. As for the installation costs, κ, we follow the existing literature by
setting in such a way as to dampen “suﬃciently” the volatility of investments.
In particular, we set κ = 5. The eﬀect of reducing this value would be to
increase the impact of the shock on investment. As discussed above, this
would have the eﬀect of increasing dramatically the cost of production and
hence the price level. Minor adjustment costs would make a deterioration of the
21In particular, we follow Sutherland (1998), Chari et al. (2000), Bergin and Feenstra
(2000) and Erceg (1997). Changing the parameter values around the assigned numbers does
not alter the quality of our results.
22current account more likely. Overhead costs are calibrated so to have zero pure
proﬁts in equilibrium, as is common in this class of models. Overhead costs
magnify the response of the current account without having any qualitative
eﬀect on the dynamics. The share of labour in production is assumed to be 0.2
with input-output and 0.7 without; the share of capital is assumed to be 0.16
with input-output, unless speciﬁed otherwise. Notice ﬁnally that imposing a
constant mark-up will amount to imposing ε = ω =  ω. Various values are
assigned to the remaining parameters as stated below.
4.2.1 The current account with and without capital
Figure (1) to (9) show a set of simulations in which the steady-state level of
the mark-up varies. The graphs report the dynamic response of a selection of
variables to an unexpected 1% increase in the domestic money stock.
Figures (1) and (2) show a current account improvement. This is obtained
by setting the elasticity of substitution between imported goods and domes-
tically produced goods (ML hereafter) at 5 and the elasticity of the interest
rate premium at 10−3 (so that the premium just eliminates the unit root).22 In
the ﬁrst graph the mark-up is set at 1.25 while in the second a value of 2 has
been imposed.23 At these levels of competition there is suﬃcient real rigidity
22An ML elasticity of this magnitude has recently been suggested by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(2000). Lower values have been suggested by other authors (e.g. Backus et al. (1994)).
23There has been much debate about the average size of the mark-up as well as its cycli-
cality. Small (1997), who argues against the countercyclicality of the mark-up, reports
some estimated values of the latter for the United Kingdom; these are never greater than
2. Indeed, the median ﬁrm has a mark-up of about 1.1, i.e. about ε =1 0 . Galeotti and
Schiantarelli (1998), who argue in favor of a countercyclical mark-up for the United States,
provide sectoral mark-ups generally smaller than 2. Kiley (1997) obtains his countercyclical
markup assuming very high steady state mark-up (µ =1 .4). A mark-up greater than one
is not necessarily associated with pure proﬁts: overheads might indeed absorb all the wedge
23in prices to induce a large “expenditure switching” in favour of the devaluing
(home) country. This eﬀect is clearly more marked the higher the mark-up.
Figure (3) shows that reducing the monopolistic distortion, i.e. the mark-
up, to 1.053(i.e. 20 /19) induces a stronger response by domestic prices and
hence a deterioration of the current account. This result clearly shows that
the degree of competition can have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the current account
response to nominal shocks. The possibility of highlighting this fact rests on
the detailed structure of modern open economy models. Earlier models in
this class (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995)) paid attention to the distinction
between the ML elasticity and the degree of competition. The further contribu-
tion of this study is to show that the two elasticities (ML and that underlying
the mark-up) can have signiﬁcant eﬀects, through diﬀerent channels, on the
current account response.
The traditional Marshall-Lerner mechanism is still clearly in operation.
Figure (4) and (5) show how the mark-up eﬀect interacts with the Marshall-
Lerner eﬀect. Here the ML elasticity is reduced to 2 (other parameters un-
changed). With such low substitutability between domestic and imported
goods the “expenditure switching” is reduced. The devaluing (home) coun-
try cannot beneﬁt greatly from the devaluation; the current account is more
likely to deteriorate. However with a high degree of monopolistic distortion
the mark-up eﬀect produces an improvement in the current account position.24
Figures (6)-(9) show the important role of the “input-output” structure in the
between price and marginal cost as in the simulation results shown in this study.
24The sign switching is clearly very impressive, especially considering the plausible set of
values given to the parameters. However, it is more appropriate to think of the mark-up
eﬀect as a positive relationship between the mark-up and the current account response. In
practice we can only expect, ceteris paribus, a milder deterioration of the current account
or a more pronounced improvement in a country with less perfect competition.
24dynamic response of the economy. The ﬁrst two graphs report the dynamic
path of an economy without the “input-output” structure, with the ML elas-
ticity set at 2 and the elasticity of the premium still at 10−3. The second two
graphs show an economy with “input-output” but without capital accumula-
tion. By comparing the two settings one can easily see that the “input-output”
technology adds a considerable dynamics to the economy while capital accu-
mulation per se forces the economy to revert quickly to the steady-state, which
is consistent with our earlier analysis.
4.2.2 Persistence, variable mark-ups and input-output
This study shows the existence of a relationship between the degree of com-
petition and the response of the current account to monetary shocks, and this
works through the degree of real rigidity. Any factor that reduces the response
of the optimal price to the monetary shock is bound to produce the same
eﬀect. Our model has another source of real rigidity built in: the potential
countercyclicality of the mark-up. As Gal´ i (1994, 1996) shows, whenever the
more procyclical demand component has a lower elasticity of substitution, the
mark-up will move counter-cyclically.25
In our model we ﬁnd that the countercyclicality of the mark-up is positively
related to the size of the steady-state mark-up. Indeed, we also ﬁnd that the
countercyclicality is not negligible only for extremely high mark-ups. This
implies that this source of real rigidity depends heavily on the real rigidity
produced by the degree of competition: the former is high when the latter is
high.
The following table shows some simulation results in relation to the coun-
25This property is highlighted by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and is used in Kiley
(1997) to generate persistence in a closed economy model.
25tercyclicality of the mark-up and the current account. It also shows the eﬀect
on the persistence of the “output gap”, i.e. the deviation of the home output
from its long-run level, as deﬁned by the percentage coverage of the output
gap by the second period. We select two periods for the sake of convenience.
In the second period about 75% of prices have been adjusted. The smaller the
output gap adjustment compared with the exogenous price adjustment, the
bigger the endogenous persistence produced by the model.26
Case ε =2
˜ M =1 % ∆ Ygap ∆µ ∆B
(1) K & Z;  ω − ω = 1 61% −0.30% 4.7%
(2) K & Z;  ω − ω = 0 67% 0 3.45%
(3) Z only;  ω − ω = 1 46% −0.34% 10.22%
(4) Z only;  ω − ω =0 6 3% 0 6 .73%
Table 1: Persistence and mark-up variability.
Cases (1) and (2) in table (1) relate to an economy with both “input-
output” and capital accumulation. Cases (3) and (4) in the same table refer
to an economy without capital accumulation. The table shows that a counter-
cyclical mark-up increases persistence and improves the response of the current
account to monetary shocks.27
26For this experiment we have set η =2 0a n dθ =1 .5 so to emphasise the mark-up
variability. This experiment does not aim at realism. As we claim in the text, this source
of “real rigidity” does not seem to be of importance in plausible parameter ranges. The
elasticity of the premium is set to 10−3.
27We also experimented with a more volatile demand for investment (κ =0 .1). The result
was a more marked countercyclicality of the mark-up at the expenses of persistence. This is
because the increase in costs of production due to the large shift in demand for investment
goods more than oﬀsets the reduction in mark-up. Nevertheless, the underlying result did
hold in terms of real rigidity and the current account.
26The economy without capital accumulation shows more persistence. The
increase in persistence due to the variable markup is also more marked in the
economy without capital accumulation. These results are considerable only at
very high degree of monopolistic distortion. Therefore, while they conﬁrm that
important sources or real rigidity would have consequences on the response of
the current account, the markup variability induced by the composite demand
model contributes only very marginally to the dynamics of our model.
Finally, table (2) shows how the “input-output” technology aﬀects both
persistence and the response of the current account. In this experiment there
is no capital accumulation and we ML elasticity was set at −5 and the mark-up
at 2.
material share ∆Ygap ∆B
αZ =0 .8 51% 1.82%
αZ =0 .2 66% 0.60%
Table 2: Persistence and input-output.
As expected, a higher share of intermediate goods in production increases
persistence and tends to improve the current account response to the 1% in-
crease in the home money stock.
5 Conclusions
This study has shown that the degree of monopolistic competition, as mea-
sured by the mark-up, is negatively related to the elasticity of the optimal
price with respect to nominal shocks. This positive relationship between the
mark-up and the degree of real rigidity is an important source of persistence
of the real eﬀects of monetary shocks as well as an important determinant
27of the response of the current account to the same shocks. The mechanism
through which this relationship operates in this model is simple: the higher
the mark-up the lower the share of total output attributable to the factors of
production. If intermediate goods are sold at the same price as ﬁnal goods (or
a constant proportion), a lower quantity of intermediate goods are produced
per unit of output. This implies reduced pressure on the scarce resources and
hence reduced production costs. The optimal price set by the ﬁrms, and the
aggregate price level, change proportionally less, the higher the mark-up. In an
open economy this translates into an increased “expenditure switching” con-
sequent upon a monetary shock. While the exchange rate depreciation, per
se, makes domestic goods more attractive, the increased real rigidity reduces
their price response and hence allows for a stronger demand switching. The
current account clearly beneﬁts from this.
The New Open Economy literature has recently emphasised the need to dis-
tinguish between the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported
goods and the degree of competition in the domestic economy. The former
elasticity is at the centre of the Marshall-Lerner condition, and hence that
which has traditionally been associated with the current account response to
a devaluation. Our paper shows that the degree of competition can also aﬀect
the response of the current account, and through a distinct mechanism.
The composite demand structure used in our set-up also allows for a coun-
tercyclical mark-up. This further lessens the response of the optimal price to
the monetary shock, again to the beneﬁt of the current account.
While we have assumed imperfections in the goods market , the main con-
clusions of this paper would, in fact, carry over to a model with labour market
imperfections. In that case the degree of unionisation in the labour market
could be the counterpart to our measure of goods market competition.
28This paper contributes both to the vast literature that addresses the per-
sistence issue and to the New Open Economy literature on the current account
dynamics. It does so by highlighting the close connection between the sources
of “real rigidity” - and hence persistence - and the response of the current
account to nominal shocks.
The empirical relevance of the speciﬁc mechanism developed in our model
remains an open question which deserves further scrutiny.
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